YEREVAN, JULY 13, NOYAN TAPAN. The Presidents of Russia, the U.S. and France adopted a statement on the Nagorno Karabakh problem on July 10 at the G8 Summit in L'Aquila, Italy. Noyan Tapan received a commentary by Masis Mayilian, Chairman of Public Council on Foreign Policy and Security, former Deputy Foreign Minister of NKR, concerning that statement and the basic principles of the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Below is the complete text of the commentary: "The text of the joint statement on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict by Russian Federation President Dmitry Medvedev, U.S. President Barack Obama, and President of France Nicolas Sarkozy hardly differs from other statements made earlier at various levels and within the framework of various international structures in support of the OSCE Minsk process. It is noteworthy that now the Presidents of the three countries urge the Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities to finalize their agreement on concrete principles of settlement that were published on the official website of the OSCE (http://www.osce.org/item/38731.html). We will try to shortly comment upon each principle: 1. Return of territories around Nagorno Karabakh under Azerbaijan's control Ceding any territory under NKR's control to Azerbaijan will mean first of all violation of the NKR's Basic law, the Constitution, where these territories are fixed. Secondly, withdrawal of the subdivisions of the NKR army from even part of the liberated territories will undermine the military and food security of NKR. The published principles have even no hint at the return of more than 1000 sq/m of Karabakh lands occupied by Azerbaijan to NKR control. Not territories, but borders between NKR and Azerbaijan should be spoken about at the negotiations. Only after the recognition of NKR statehood by Azerbaijan should a bilateral intergovernmental commission work on delimitation and demarcation of the state frontiers. It is the international practice of solving frontier arguments. 2. An interim status for Nagorno Karabakh, providing security and self-governance guarantees In reality, this principle means an attempt to limit NKR sovereignty by casting doubt on its independent status and to deprive the republic of its own security system. It is the recognition of NKR independence that would really ensure the security of NKR and would give Artsakh new possibilities for maintaining its own security, including with political-diplomatic means. 3. Corridor between Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh The land communication between NKR and Armenia was established in May 1992 and was enlarged during the operations of 1993. It would be naive to limit the current full-value land communication of NKR with Armenia to a vulnerable "corridor." It is noteworthy that this principle is presented as a concession to the Armenians. 4. Determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will The legal status of NKR has already been determined on the basis of legally binding expression of will on December 10, 1991 and was confirmed by another referendum on adoption of the NKR Constitution on December 10, 2006. Besides, eight times the people of NKR have indirectly expressed their adherence to independent statehood in republican presidential and parliamentary elections by voting for programs of political parties and individual candidates, in which the necessity of international recognition and strengthening of NKR statehood was mentioned. Thus, over the past 18 years, the citizens of NKR expressed their support ten times for the independent status of NKR. 5. Ensuring the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to places of their former residence This principle can be discussed by all three sides after the recognition of NKR independence by Azerbaijan. A positive moment is the use of the word "all" and not only Azeri refugees. Yet, it is not understandable who can ensure the rights and guarantee the security, and how, of hundreds of thousands of people who may find themselves in the territory of the opposite side. 6. International guarantees of security, including peacekeeping operations In essence, we are suggested replacing our own current system of military security with an inefficient mechanism of "the blue helmets." Possible appearance of foreign armed forces in the territory of NKR, even under the flag of authoritative international organizations, will immediately result in an abrupt limitation of the republic's sovereignty. The circumstance that NKR sovereignty has not yet been recognized by the international community, and the country is not represented at the above-mentioned structures, can result in Karabakh's having no levers of influence on these forces guaranteed by international law. Under these circumstances, a possible introduction of peacekeeping forces will radically contradict our national interests. NKR cannot limit its state sovereignty without receiving its all-embracing international juridical recognition. The passage of a state's direct obligations on maintaining security, together with concrete territories, to a third side do not guarantee the strengthening of this very security, and poses new threats. Karabakh residents have their own experience of communicating with the "peacekeepers" of the Soviet period, when troops sent in late 1980s for keeping the population's security chronically did not cope with their duties and failed to protect the Armenian population of the Azerbaijani SSR from massacres and violence. In 1991, by the order of the USSR leadership, these very troops banished the Armenian population from some parts of Artsakh (the Koltso operation). The peacekeeping operations demonstrated low efficiency in other conflict zones as well. For the governments sending peacekeepers to a conflict region, their interests and the immediate security of these very peacekeepers will be always more important than the security of the local population. The published basic principles, in case of their adoption and realization, will damage irreparably the national interests of NKR and the Republic of Armenia. The inadmissibility of the basic principles of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement has been fixed in the Resolution of the All-Armenian Conference held on July 10-11, 2009 in the capital city of NKR. Participants of the conference from Armenia, Artsakh, and the Diaspora demanded that the authorities of the Republic of Armenia not sign the proposed document. Obviously, there is an understanding that ceding territories to the enemy, in which the Armenian people has juridical and political, as well as historic rights, will be a strong moral blow for the Armenian people, which can deprive them for years of the will of resistance and motivation of building their own statehood."

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