"Erdogan's Double Blow to Putin: A Bold Stance against Putin's Plans"
01-03-2024 13:32:22 | Armenia | Politics
In a recent discussion on Noyan Tapan, analyst Armen Hovhannisyan shared insights on the geopolitical developments following the Munich Security Conference, particularly the meeting between Azerbaijani President Aliyev and Turkish President Erdogan. The analyst delves into Erdogan's public statements urging Aliyev against succumbing to Russian pressure on military actions against Armenia. These observations, provided by Armen Hovhannisyan, shed light on the intricate dynamics shaping the South Caucasus region.
The evident provocation by Russia had been acknowledged even before Erdogan's statements. Statements by Mikhail Yevdokimov, the Russian ambassador in Baku, and the head of the CSTO military unit, serve not only as retrospective justifications but also as provocations for future engagements.
Aliyev's presence in Munich signifies more than a personal move. While Aliyev is diplomatically involved, the core issue is not his individual stance. The analyst posits that Aliyev, characterized as a strategic player, would not desire Armenia's downfall. On the other hand, Russia through the conflict, achieves two objectives: stationing military units as peacekeepers along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border in Syunik and destabilizing both Armenia and Azerbaijan's international standing.
Furthermore, the analyst suggests that both Azerbaijan and Armenia face the risk of losing their international standing. Armenia will be portrayed as a dysfunctional, crushed nation that is forced to submit to Russia. In addition, Azerbaijan could be relegated to a North Korea-like status – a marginal pariah with limited international engagements, including the absence of gas and oil contracts, and restricted entry for its leaders.
This predicament leaves Azerbaijan with limited choices, seemingly pushing it towards a closer alliance with Russia. However, this geopolitical maneuver is not only unwelcome in the West but also poses challenges for Erdogan and Aliyev. Erdogan, in pursuit of diverse financial investments, explores multiple sources, including potential ties with Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing nations.
Yet, such associations could jeopardize his aspirations for restoring the caliphate, given the dependency it would entail.
Simultaneously, Erdogan looks to the West for economic partnerships, evident in his engagements with Greece and the confirmation of Sweden's membership. His swift efforts to enhance relations with Egypt also play a role. Notably, Erdogan's agenda includes fostering improved relations between the West and Armenian-Turkish ties, as well as contributing to the enhancement of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations – a stance emphasized by O'Brien during Congress hearings.
According to the analyst, the meeting with Aliyev, can be seen as a strategic move for Turkey. The assertion is that Turkey influenced and persuaded Aliyev to attend the Munich gathering, delivering a double blow to Russia. Firstly, Aliyev's presence in Munich itself was a symbolic challenge to Russian influence, and secondly, his meeting with Zelensky demonstrated a clear message: "Russia, I am not your soldier."
The subsequent visit to Turkey is portrayed as a predictable response to Russia's likely displeasure. The analyst suggests that Aliyev's purpose in meeting Erdogan is to seek protection from potential Russian repercussions. Erdogan's inclination to support Azerbaijan is underscored, emphasizing the fraternal ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan. In Erdogan's perspective, Azerbaijan's actions should align with Turkey's interests rather than Russia's.
Erdogan's statement, attributing Azerbaijan's military operations to Russia's instigation, highlights the complex dynamics at play. The analyst contends that Azerbaijan faces a choice between being perceived as an aggressor, resulting in sanctions, or positioning itself as a victim. Despite the victim narrative, Russia remains unresponsive to Azerbaijan's predicament in this context.
Putin's assertion that Turkey is Russia's most reliable partner is seen as a deliberate reminder to Erdogan. The narrative suggests that Russia harbors jealousy towards Turkey's gradual normalization of relations with the West, a process Erdogan is navigating in a more measured manner compared to potential Kemalist governance.
The defeat of the Kemalists and the subsequent influence of the West on the opposition aimed at preventing post-election developments paved the way for Erdogan's approach. This approach, while somewhat aligned with the Kemalists, leans towards improving relations with the West. Russia's jealousy is underscored, prompting Putin's hasty desire to visit Turkey.
The Eurasian line and Russia's plans, integral to their aggression against Ukraine, become crucial in this context. The analyst highlights Russia's success in the South Caucasus, gaining allies in Azerbaijan and Turkey, not Armenia. The alliance's stability is uncertain, but common interests and the shared mentality of the regimes, albeit led by what is described as three criminal leaders, could be potential binding factors.
The current crisis prompts Putin to remind the Turks of their shared history, but the Turkish response signals a desire to avoid association with Russia, emphasizing that such ties are not beneficial and should not disturb Turkey's current trajectory.
During the Munich Security Conference, Aliyev openly stated that Russia occupied territories in Ukraine, whereas Pashinyan's stance was more restrained, emphasizing Armenia's non-alignment in the Ukrainian matter without explicitly terming it as occupation. This nuanced difference resulted in Armenia facing criticism, while Azerbaijan was seemingly forgiven.
The analyst posits that Azerbaijan's perceived forgiveness stems from being considered an ally, whereas Armenia is viewed merely as a possession that could be traded or handed over to Turkey if opportune in the Western context. This perspective sheds light on the challenge of understanding how Russians perceive Armenia, as opposed to our evaluations.
Many individuals, both in prominent positions and the public, may not comprehend the Russian perspective. While it is often assumed that being anti-Russian or pro-Russian defines one's stance, the reality is more complex. The analyst suggests that Russians view Armenia not as a partner but as a possession lying at their feet, akin to their property. The entry of the West into these relations is perceived as a stressor, disrupting Russian plans and exerting pressure on Azerbaijan and Turkey, identified as Russia's partners.
The realization that improving relations with Russia might be challenging at this stage due to this perceived status prompts a reconsideration of illusions. People are encouraged to grasp the essence and prospects of Armenian-Russian relations in light of this complex dynamic.
There is no guarantee that Russia will ever consider us even as a junior partner. The historical behavior of Imperial Russia towards Armenia reveals alternating periods, including times of involvement, temptation, and coercion. Leaders like Stalin, Putin, and Nicholas II have, at times, exhibited actions that metaphorically "hit us on the head," leaving us with little chance to resist while seemingly entrenched in challenging circumstances.
The historical reference to the 10th century Treaty of Turkmencha highlights a past when Russia initially supported Armenia. However, this support was short-lived, and dynamics shifted dramatically, redirecting assistance towards the Muslim population and Georgians in the Caucasus. This historical narrative underscores the volatile and unpredictable nature of Armenia's relationship with Russia, marked by changing alliances and geopolitical realities.
The discussion delves into Russia's attitude towards Armenia during the times of Serzh Sargsyan and Robert Kocharyan. Serzh Sargsyan assumed the presidency in 2008, and by 2010-2011, a Russian-Turkish-Azerbaijani trio began to form, three years into his tenure. The analyst suggests that this period allows for conclusions about how Russia treated Armenia under Sargsyan's leadership.
The reference to "absorption stages" during Kocharyan's reign implies a historical perspective, indicating that certain regions or assets may have been exchanged for property and debt. The mention of Gazprom and regions to seize raises questions about the dynamics of Russia's involvement and Armenia's concessions during that time.
Furthermore, the narrative describes Russia and Turkey as partners in the division and joint control of the South Caucasus. The analysis posits that both nations acknowledge a changing dynamic where Russia's role objectively diminishes, and Turkey's role rises.
This restructuring, outlined in Turkish discussions, is presented as a less painful scenario for Russia compared to potential Western examples. Azerbaijan is portrayed as a common interest, closely tied to Russia and Turkey, and seen as a strategic asset against the remaining countries in the region: Georgia, Armenia, and Iran. This perspective suggests a collaborative effort to arm and prepare Azerbaijan within the geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus.
The situation is portrayed as highly critical, with Erdogan stating that Russia is provoking a war on Armenia. This statement is deemed truthful, aligning with the views of many observers. Erdogan's vocal stance is seen as a demonstration to the West that he is prepared for more significant actions than they may request. The economic challenges, exacerbated by events like earthquakes, are pressing for Turkey, yet Russia appears less concerned about these issues.
Erdogan's accusatory finger towards Russia suggests frustration with Russian priorities that diverge from addressing Turkey's economic woes. The narrative concludes with the assertion that Azerbaijan will not allow Russia to have unchecked influence in the region, indicating a proactive stance from Azerbaijan in shaping its relationship with Russia.
New French and European visits to Armenia are in the plans. According to the analyst, the meeting between Pashinyan and Macron in France was initiated by France and decided by Macron himself, expressing confidence in strong public support. There is a nationwide consensus on relations with Armenia, both politically and civically.
Macron's speech emphasized the importance of today and tomorrow, with an emphasis on building a common future for two neighboring, allied countries. However, the analyst suggests that these words need institutionalization through treaties, and France is reportedly ready for such commitments. Concerns arise as some in the Armenian elite perceive France's involvement as provocative, pushing for a peace treaty with Turkey.
The analogy of a coming wave symbolizes a pivotal moment for Armenia, where the population must grasp the potential impact – whether it uplifts or submerges them. This policy of perception in the South Caucasus is led by the European Union, primarily France and Germany, with backing from the United States and India.
The narrative extends to Azerbaijan, predicting two potential paths: either having normal relations with the West, benefiting from selling gas and oil, or becoming a "monster" marked by hatred and aggression. The analyst contends that any attempts to obstruct the West's entry into the South Caucasus are considered crimes, with potential consequences for the entire Armenian population.
Regionalism is deemed perilous, implying a relinquishment of development opportunities.
In summary, the analyst explores the intricate geopolitics of the South Caucasus, particularly Armenia's relations with Russia, Turkey, and the West. It underscores the evolving dynamics, diplomatic efforts, and potential challenges, urging careful consideration for Armenia's future amidst shifting alliances and regional complexities.
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