1in.am After the recent chill in Russian-Azerbaijani relations, the phone call made today by Vladimir Putin to Ilham Aliyev at the initiative of the Russian president is not ordinary diplomatic courtesy. The most important words in the Kremlin's message are not even the discussed "trade-economic and humanitarian issues," but rather the agreement to activate bilateral communications at various levels.
Moscow and Baku are apparently trying to manage the tension that has accumulated in the relations between the two countries recently. And this is important for Armenia.
Russian-Azerbaijani relations have never been solely bilateral. At their core, they have always involved the power balance in the South Caucasus, energy, transportation routes, Turkey, Iran, and the factor of Armenia. Since 2020, the significance of these relations has increased; Russia was losing its former monopoly in the region, while Azerbaijan, with Turkey's support, was gaining greater independence.
Now the geopolitical environment is changing again. Armenia is deepening its relations with the United States and the European Union, the Armenian-Turkish normalization is acquiring an economic substance, and TRIPP is changing previous perceptions about regional communications. In this context, both Moscow and Baku have reasons to reassess their necessity to each other.
For Russia, Azerbaijan must be seen as an important link connecting it with the Caspian Sea, Iran, and Turkey. For Azerbaijan, Russia continues to be needed as a major neighbor, market, and power center, with open opposition giving little to Baku.
But in Yerevan, this phone conversation should be interpreted without old fears and without illusions.
One of the most costly mistakes in Armenia's recent history has been the belief that a "fraternal" relationship with Russia means that Moscow will necessarily prioritize Armenia's interests over its relations with Azerbaijan. It did not. Great powers do not inherit friendships; they calculate interests.
One of the most costly illusions in Armenia's recent history was the belief that a fraternal relationship with Russia automatically means that at a decisive moment, Moscow would prioritize Armenia's security and interests over its relations with Azerbaijan. It did not.
Great powers do not inherit friendships and do not maintain loyalty out of gratitude; they calculate strength, price, and their own interests. Therefore, the main mistake was not even Moscow's calculation. The mistake was Yerevan's belief that in someone else's calculation, Armenia's interests could be valued higher than that of the other party.
The main lesson from the Putin-Aliyev interaction is familiar to Yerevan, but it has not yet been fully internalized. Russia will never sacrifice Armenia to Azerbaijan, just as Azerbaijan will not sacrifice Turkey to Russia. Such emotional loyalty simply does not exist in the politics of great powers and regional forces.
The years 2020–2023 came at an extremely high price for Armenia. Russia was Armenia's strategic ally, there were Russian peacekeepers in Artsakh, Armenia was a member of the CSTO, but this entire system failed to prevent either the war, the attacks on Armenia's sovereign territory, or the depopulation of Artsakh. And today, Moscow is once again restoring relations with Baku, because that is what Russia's interests demand.
Therefore, Armenia's response should not be yet another understanding of what Moscow is agreeing with Baku. The response should be to build a state whose fate cannot be determined during Moscow-Baku, Moscow-Ankara, or any other bilateral negotiations.
This means accelerating the diversification of foreign policy, deepening security relations with the United States and Europe, developing relations with France, India, and Iran, completing normalization with Turkey, and making its own defense capability the primary, not the last, guarantee of security.
Because Putin's call to Aliyev once again reminds us of a simple truth: Moscow returns to Baku as often as Russia's interests demand. Armenia must also finally begin to be guided not by the expectation of others' loyalty, but exclusively by its own state interests.
The new principle of Armenia's foreign policy should be simple: no one owes us enough to defend Armenia in our place.
And a state that has understood this no longer seeks allies to surrender itself. It multiplies partners to increase its ability to defend itself.
* This text was automatically translated by Artificial Intelligence (AI).
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