1in.am The Azerbaijani campaign around Gandzasar has escalated over the past few days, involving religious communities, dozens of NGOs, state media, and now the leadership of the National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan.
On September 18, the president of the academy, the vice president, the head of the Nakhchivan branch, and about two dozen scholars jointly declared Gandzasar as a monument of Caucasian Albania, stating that it has no connection to Armenian history. They refer to Hasan Jalal as a prominent Azerbaijani statesman, while accusing the Armenian side of altering and destroying inscriptions, crosses, and graves.
The political conclusion of the statement is particularly important. The Armenian response regarding Gandzasar is presented as an attempt to disrupt Azerbaijan's peace agenda. Thus, the dispute over cultural heritage is linked to Armenia's commitment to peace.
This is already a much larger issue than the question of Gandzasar's ownership.
International Armenian studies on Gandzasar present a completely different picture. In a recent study published by the International Association of Armenian Studies, Hasan Jalal is portrayed as an Armenian prince, and the long inscription of Gandzasar is seen as an important source of his construction activities. In other words, the claims put forward by Baku are not accepted and indisputable truths in historiography, no matter how they are presented in official statements.
However, the political significance of the ongoing process in Azerbaijan is broader than the historical debate.
Within a few hours, the same message was successively echoed by the Albanian religious community, NGOs, state information platforms, and the National Academy of Sciences. This sequence indicates the elevation of the topic to a state level. It is still too early to make definitive judgments about its ultimate goal, but the impact is clear: the question of the Armenian cultural presence in Artsakh is gradually becoming part of state political discourse.
In Armenia, this topic is predictably painful. Artsakh was depopulated just three years ago. People lost their homes, graves, churches, and their historical environment. The dispute over the Armenian identity of Gandzasar or Dadivank will not be perceived merely as a historiographical viewpoint under these circumstances. It directly touches upon the most sensitive point of loss.
Baku cannot fail to understand this. Yerevan must also understand another thing.
In August 2025, the text of the peace agreement was initially signed in Washington, but as of September 2026, the final agreement has not yet been signed. Even after the signing, disputes over historical memory, cultural heritage, and identity will not disappear.
Peace is a much larger and longer process than simply stopping the gunfire, and such historical and cultural disputes are not unique to the South Caucasus. Georgia and Azerbaijan have been strategic partners for decades, with major energy and transportation projects, yet they have not resolved the border and historical dispute surrounding the David Gareja monastery complex. In 2019, tensions even flared between Georgian clergy and Azerbaijani border guards there. This contradiction has not undermined the cooperation between the two states.
Similarly, disputes over ecclesiastical heritage have persisted for years between Armenia and Georgia. The Georgian Orthodox Church has laid claims to several monasteries in Lori and Tavush, while the Armenian Church has raised ownership issues regarding Armenian churches in Tbilisi and Akhaltsikhe. These issues exist alongside the diplomatic relations of the two countries and are managed without military conflict.
This is the important lesson for Armenia. Every Azerbaijani statement regarding Gandzasar should not turn into a national hysterical outcry. Of course, silence is not an option either. There must be a documented, scientifically robust, and internationally presentable response, supported by inscriptions, manuscripts, architectural studies, contemporary testimonies, and works of foreign scholars.
History is defended through manuscripts, archives, science, and consistent work in international institutions. Azerbaijan is currently occupying that space, shifting its historical policy from NGOs to academia and state communication systems.
Armenia must also have an institutional response.
The peace treaty, when signed, may close one of the legal chapters of military conflict, but it will not close the disputes over history, memory, and heritage. States in the Caucasus will continue to argue for a long time over churches, place names, manuscripts, medieval princes, and historical borders.
Keeping those disputes manageable is also a peace policy. What is happening around Gandzasar today is one of the first serious tests of that new reality.
The fire may cease at the border. The struggle for history continues even after that.
* This text was automatically translated by Artificial Intelligence (AI).
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